January 09, 2003

Where are the Layer 7 Guys ’n Gals?

Stuart Lynn: "...potential problems [with IDNA] cannot be solved at the protocol level; they must instead be addressed by registries in their technical implementations and registration policies. Because these problems are common to all DNS registries that choose to implement IDNA, it is essential to have a global forum for registry-level dialogue, consultation, and exchange of information, open to the registries, registrars, and technical experts closest to the issue."

IETF IDNA Draft: "IDNA depends on updates to user applications only; no changes are needed to the DNS protocol or any DNS servers or the resolvers on user's computers."

Rader: "I'm praying that somewhere in the IDN Implementation Group room is made for the application developers that will need to make the changes. The DNS world isn't just "Registries", "Registrars" and "Users". This is why an Infrastructure Services Provider Constituency is sooo important to the development of reasonable policy within ICANN. Without it, the entire range of problems can't be explored and solved." Sidenote: I'm heartened to see that steps are being taken to grab this bull by the horns. I can't stress enough (as I tried to earlier this week) how disastrous this could become if an appropriate administrative framework isn't put into place.
Posted by system at 02:46 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Thu, 09 Jan 2003 16:38:36 GMT

BTW - if things are flaky, its because I am migrating to a new colo and new software. Things are going to be upside down for about a week I figure.
Posted by system at 11:38 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Thu, 09 Jan 2003 13:48:57 GMT

Nice, but its not addressable. Make it addressable and toss in a Wi-Fi card. Please?
Posted by system at 08:48 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Secure before internet...

Sclavos: "The bigger concern is whether the open Internet allows someone into a network that is less resilient--into a power grid, for example, or into a water treatment plant. Because the Internet now has an open connection, and somehow you can figure out a way to get into that other network that was thought to be secure before. That's where the greater risk is. It' s not the Internet itself, but to what the Internet now allows access. "

Frankston: "Naive models of trust have not only festered but have become endemic. Simple (minded) file sharing has an us/them model with the assumption that them is still us. Microsoft's Trust model and Verisign's certification give me a Hobson's choice of 100% trust or 0% trust. I can't have qualified trust which might allow a program to help me edit a picture but not run rampant through my file system. This naive model of trust is endemic throughout Microsoft's systems. Microsoft is far from alone in this naiveté. Identifying someone as a spammer is little different -- I might want the catalog that you consider junk. This is a complex topic in its own right and I will write about this in more length. There are many related issues including confusing identity with certification. "

Posted by system at 12:25 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack